AS919
AS919 announces 8 IPv4 and 0 IPv6 prefixes and peers with 1 other networks.
Summary
- // analyst note
- Small, actively routed ASN: RouteViews observed 8 IPv4 / 0 IPv6 prefixes and 1 neighboring ASN (AS807) on 2026-08-20; this is a single collector snapshot, not a registry-declared allocation size. AS807 is a CAIDA-INFERRED provider among published neighbours (CAIDA AS Relationships, dataset date 2026-08-01 — a separate observation from the RouteViews snapshot, from a single counterparty-side row, not a disclosed peering agreement), with no customers or peers classified. No operator-published source names AS919; searches for a peering policy, network/IR page, looking glass, or NANOG/RIPE post under an operator's own name found none, so operator, name, website, country, and org status stay Unknown. RIR is ARIN, from the IANA AS Number registry range 1-1876. Allocation date, RPKI status, IX presence, and abuse contacts are Unknown as of 2026-08.
- // security note
- NEUTRAL/DATED: no operator identity established, so no operator-side abuse finding applies.
About this ASN.
AS919 is a small, actively routed autonomous system with no operator identity confirmed by any permitted, operator-published source; RouteViews observed it originating 8 IPv4 prefixes and zero IPv6 prefixes on 2026-08-20. That places it far below the customer-facing carrier scale seen in networks like AS1273, but it is not dormant — the announcement is live and current.
At that same RouteViews observation, AS919 showed exactly one neighboring ASN, AS807, and an estimated 57,344 IPv4 addresses across its 8 prefixes, with no 6to4 or other special-purpose-block distortion evident. These are single-collector figures tied to the 2026-08-20 dump time, not a registry-declared allocation size.
A separate dataset supplies relationship direction. The CAIDA AS Relationships cache (dataset date 2026-08-01) contains no row with AS919 as the first column; the only match is a counterparty-side row, 807,919,customer, which inverts to AS807 being an inferred provider of AS919. No customers or settlement-free peers are classified among published neighbours. This is an inference from observed AS paths, not a disclosed peering agreement, and a floor rather than a census.
The IANA AS Number registry places AS919 in the 1-1876 range recorded as "Assigned by ARIN," so its administering RIR is ARIN. Allocation date, RPKI validation posture, IX presence, peering policy, and abuse contacts are all Unknown as of 2026-08 — no permitted source supplies them.
Searches for operator-published material naming AS919 — a peering policy, a network/IR page, a looking glass, a NANOG or RIPE list post under an operator's own name — found none. Every result that names AS919 is third-party directory or mirror content, which does not meet the binding test for operator identity, so operator, legal name, website, country, and org status all stay Unknown.
Separately, third-party proxy-intelligence research published by Spur in August 2026 found that roughly 21% of one residential-proxy provider's IP pool (about 17,000 distinct proxy IPs) egressed through address space this ASN announces, at a scale (about 224 /24-equivalent subnets) consistent with the RouteViews address estimate above. That pattern pushes CAPTCHA challenges, fraud flags, and blocklisting onto other users of the network rather than reflecting misconduct by whoever operates it.
- Live routing
- RouteViews observed AS919 originating 8 IPv4 prefixes and 0 IPv6 prefixes with exactly 1 neighboring ASN (AS807) on 2026-08-20 — a small but active footprint, not a dormant registration — the RouteViews BGP routing data (CC BY 4.0) AS919
- Inferred upstream
- CAIDA AS Relationships (dataset date 2026-08-01) classifies AS807 as a provider to AS919 via a single counterparty-side row (807,919,customer); this is an inference from observed AS paths, not a disclosed agreement — the cached registry snapshots/caida-as-rel.csv (row 807,919,customer)
- Operator identity
- No operator-published source names AS919; only third-party directories and mirrors reference it, none of which meets the binding test, so operator, name, and website stay Unknown as of an August 2026 search
- Operator
- Unknown — no operator-published source names AS919; the only material naming it is third-party directory/mirror content, which does not establish operator identity under the binding test [Unknown] — searched as of an August 2026 search
- Country / RIR
- Country Unknown — no operator-published source identifies a location [Unknown]. RIR: ARIN — the IANA AS Number registry records the 1-1876 range containing AS919 as "Assigned by ARIN" [Confirmed] — the IANA Autonomous System Number registry 1-1876
- Allocated
- Unknown [Unknown]
- Org status
- Unknown [Unknown]
- Contacts
- Unknown [Unknown]
Security/abuse context (NEUTRAL, DATED)
see the Security section above for the proxy-traffic exposure finding and blocklist/CVE checks as of an August 2026 search
Network & routing
- Network type
- Unknown — no operator-published material describes this network's purpose [Unknown]
- Size
- 8 IPv4 prefixes and 0 IPv6 prefixes originated; an estimated 57,344 IPv4 addresses, as observed by RouteViews on 2026-08-20 [Confirmed] — the RouteViews BGP routing data (CC BY 4.0) AS919
- Routing/peering
- 1 distinct neighboring ASN observed by RouteViews on 2026-08-20 (AS807; full set, not sample-capped). CAIDA AS Relationships (dataset date 2026-08-01) classifies AS807 as an inferred provider to AS919 via a single counterparty-side row (807,919,customer); no customers or settlement-free peers are classified among published neighbours. Peering policy: Unknown [Confirmed for the neighbor count; Inferred for the relationship role; Unknown for policy] — the RouteViews BGP routing data (CC BY 4.0) AS919, the cached registry snapshots/caida-as-rel.csv (row 807,919,customer)
- RPKI
- Unknown — an unevaluated status, not a report of an absent or invalid ROA [Unknown]
- Notable usage
- Unknown — no operator-published material describes intended use; see Security for a third-party finding on proxy-traffic exposure affecting this ASN's address space [Unknown for stated purpose; Confirmed for the Spur finding] — spur.us/blog/how-proxy-providers-co-opt-entire-networks
- Related ASNs
- AS807 (CAIDA-inferred upstream provider; see Routing/peering) [Inferred] — the cached registry snapshots/caida-as-rel.csv (row 807,919,customer)
- Related fields
- AS rank, customer cone size, IX presence, and MANRS membership are all Unknown [Unknown]
- Analyst note
- Small, actively routed ASN — 8 IPv4 / 0 IPv6 prefixes and 1 observed neighbor (AS807) per RouteViews on 2026-08-20 — with no operator binding established by any permitted source as of an August 2026 search. AS807 is a CAIDA-inferred upstream (dataset date 2026-08-01, a separate observation from the RouteViews snapshot). RIR is ARIN, from the IANA AS Number registry range 1-1876. A third-party proxy-intelligence report (Spur, August 2026) ties this ASN's address space to residential-proxy co-opting, a reputation-risk pattern rather than an operator-side abuse finding. Allocation date, RPKI status, IX presence, and abuse contacts are Unknown as of 2026-08.
What this network routes.
- 138.238.128.0/18
- 138.238.64.0/18
- 138.238.32.0/19
- 138.238.16.0/20
- 138.238.192.0/20
- 138.238.224.0/20
- 138.238.216.0/21
- 138.238.240.0/21
Who it talks to.
Neighbours observed by RouteViews at 2026-09-20, lowest ASN first. Relationships are inferences from the CAIDA AS Relationships Dataset, 2026-08-01, and establish no commercial arrangement; a dash means the inference did not resolve.
| ASN | Operator | Role |
|---|---|---|
| AS807 | Fork Systems, LLC | — |