The V-SOLUTION brand (marketed as V-SOL / VSOL) covers ten MA-L OUI blocks split across two related Guangzhou legal entities. Four blocks — 70:B6:4F, 1C:EF:03, 00:6D:61, 80:14:A8 — register to "Guangzhou V-SOLUTION Electronic Technology Co., Ltd." at the Originality Building, NO.162 Science Avenue, Science Town. The other six — 4C:D7:C8, B4:64:15, 4C:46:D1, 6C:68:A4, 80:F1:A8, 68:22:9F — register to "Guangzhou V-Solution Telecommunication Technology Co., Ltd." (founded April 2007), split between 13/F Building 1 No.13 Bohua 4th Road in Huangpu District and the same Science Avenue address. All ten are MA-L (24-bit) assignments; no MA-M or MA-S entries appear. The company manufactures ISP-grade FTTX access equipment: ONU/ONT (EPON, GPON, XGS-PON), OLT carrier platforms, Wi-Fi routers (Wi-Fi 6/7), 4G/5G CPE, switches, and VoIP gateways, sold (per vendor self-report) in 130+ countries. The single most important caveat for anyone classifying these devices is security posture: V-SOL hardware has a substantial public vulnerability history. CVE-2020-8958 is an unauthenticated OS command injection via the PING diagnostic (/boaform/admin/formPing) in the V2801RW and V2804RGW GPON home routers, disclosed July 2020 with no patch available at disclosure and ~20,000 exposed devices observed. Separately, a July 2020 full-disclosure on the V1600D/V1600G OLT platforms listed backdoor telnet credentials, hardcoded RSA private keys, a hardcoded enable password for privilege escalation, and command injection via TFTP — the researcher characterized the backdoors as apparently intentional. Earlier 2019 Exploit-DB entries (EDB-47433/47434/47435) cover unauthenticated config download, CSRF, and remote privilege escalation on the OLT Platform 2.03. Treat a V-SOL OUI as a flag for elevated scrutiny, not just identification.
- IEEE assignment
- 10 prefixes across two V-SOLUTION legal entities, all MA-L, all Guangzhou, CN [Confirmed] — enrichment/registries/oui.csv
- Registry / block size
- MA-L (24-bit OUI); 10 blocks total. No MA-M or MA-S entries found. [Confirmed] — enrichment/registries/oui.csv
- Entity 1 (4 blocks)
- "Guangzhou V-SOLUTION Electronic Technology Co., Ltd." — 70:B6:4F, 1C:EF:03, 00:6D:61, 80:14:A8; Originality Building B2/B3, NO.162 Science Avenue, Science Town, Guangzhou, Guangdong, CN 510663 [Confirmed] — enrichment/registries/oui.csv
- Entity 2 (6 blocks)
- "Guangzhou V-Solution Telecommunication Technology Co., Ltd." — 4C:D7:C8, B4:64:15, 4C:46:D1, 6C:68:A4, 80:F1:A8, 68:22:9F; 13/F Building 1, No.13 Bohua 4th Road, Huangpu District and Building B2, NO.162 Science Avenue, Guangzhou, CN 510663 [Confirmed] — enrichment/registries/oui.csv
- HQ / country
- Guangzhou, Guangdong, China (Unit 406, Floor 4, Zone B3, No.162 Kexue/Science Road, High and New Tech Development Zone) [Confirmed] — https://v-solution.goldsupplier.com/about.html
- Company founded
- April 2007 (telecommunication entity) [Confirmed] — https://www.vsolcn.com/about
- Company status
- active [Confirmed] — https://www.vsolcn.com/
- Device types
- ONU/ONT (EPON, GPON, XGS-PON), OLT (EPON/GPON/10G-EPON/XG-PON/XGS-PON), Wi-Fi 6/7 routers, 4G/5G CPE, switches, VoIP/IAD gateways, media converters [Confirmed] — https://www.vsolcn.com/about
- Registration date
- not published — IEEE publishes NO per-OUI registration date. Any "date registered" on third-party MAC tools (e.g. maclookup.app) is a database artifact, not an IEEE fact. [Unknown] — enrichment/registries/oui.csv
- Certifications
- ANATEL, CCC, CE, EAC, ISO 9001/14001/45001, China "National High-Tech Enterprise" [Likely] — https://www.vsolcn.com/about (single vendor self-report)
- Global reach
- products in 130+ countries, 40M+ devices deployed (vendor self-report) [Likely] — https://www.vsolcn.com/about
- Security note
- substantial public CVE/advisory history. CVE-2020-8958 (OS command injection via /boaform/admin/formPing, V2801RW/V2804RGW GPON routers, no patch at disclosure, ~20k exposed). 2020 OLT full-disclosure (V1600D/V1600G): backdoor telnet creds, hardcoded RSA keys, hardcoded enable password, TFTP command injection — researcher noted apparently intentional backdoors. 2019 Exploit-DB EDB-47433/47434/47435 (config download, CSRF, priv-esc on OLT Platform 2.03). [Confirmed] — https://karansaini.com/os-command-injection-v-sol/, https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2020/Jul/14, https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47435
- Analyst note
- A V-SOL OUI reliably identifies V-SOLUTION FTTX hardware, but the strong public vulnerability record means these devices warrant elevated scrutiny in asset and exposure inventories; don't treat OUI identification alone as a clean bill of health.