Hangzhou Gubei Electronics Technology Co., Ltd. (BroadLink) — 3 prefixes (MA-L)

A MAC address beginning with 78:0F:77, 34:EA:34, or C8:F7:42 belongs to Hangzhou Gubei Electronics Technology Co., Ltd., a Chinese IoT manufacturer that trades under the consumer brand BroadLink, typically seen on Wi-Fi smart plugs, universal IR/RF remote controllers, smart wall switches, environment sensors, and connected security devices.

The company is registered with IEEE at Room 106, No.611 Jianghong Road, Binjiang District, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China 310052, and holds three separate MA-L assignments rather than a single bare registration — a pattern consistent with an active manufacturer shipping multiple product lines over time rather than a shell registrant.

Independent, non-vendor sources corroborate the device context: B2B/company-profile listings describe the same product line (smart plugs, universal remotes, switches, sensors), and BroadLink's own App Store listing confirms the companion app is named "e-Control." Third-party IoT security research (Attify) treats BroadLink hardware as a real, deployed consumer product, not just a marketing claim.

That security research (Attify blog) demonstrates an evil-twin Wi-Fi attack against the Broadlink A1 air-quality sensor: an attacker who already knows the target network's SSID and password sets up a spoofed access point with matching credentials, sends deauthentication packets to force the device off its legitimate network, and the device automatically reconnects to the spoofed AP — after which the attacker can query it directly using an unofficial third-party Python client. This is researcher-sourced, not vendor-confirmed, and is narrower than a phishing flow: the article's fake-firmware-update-prompt scenario is a generic illustration of evil-twin attacks in general, not something demonstrated against this vendor's hardware. A separately circulated claim of an undocumented firmware "suicide" reset function on BroadLink devices could not be corroborated against a primary source and is not asserted here.

Third-party aggregators list registration dates of 2016-04-27, 2017-12-11, and 2018-10-13 for the three prefixes. IEEE's public OUI registry publishes no assignment dates at all, so these are database-scrape artifacts, not IEEE facts, and are not recorded here as authoritative.

IEEE assignment

3 prefixes (78:0F:77, 34:EA:34, C8:F7:42) → HangZhou Gubei Electronics Technology Co.,Ltd, registered Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China [Confirmed] — IEEE MA-L

Registry / block size

MA-L (24-bit OUI); 3 IEEE prefixes on file for this registrant [Confirmed] — IEEE the IEEE MA-L registry; cross-checked against rst.im and maclookup.app

HQ / country

Room 106, No.611 Jianghong Road, Binjiang District, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China 310052 [Confirmed] — IEEE MA-L

Company status

active; consumer brand BroadLink [Likely] — linkedin.com/company/broadlink-hangzhou-gubei-electronics-technology-co-ltd-, zoominfo.com

Device types

Wi-Fi smart plugs, universal IR/RF remote controllers, wall switches, environment sensors, security systems, soundbars [Likely] — rst.im, globalsources.com, tradewheel.com

Notable products

BroadLink "e-Control" app-paired smart home line [Likely] — blog.attify.com, apps.apple.com/us/app/broadlink-e-control/id793152994

Verified sample prefixes (all MA-L, this registrant)

78:0F:77, 34:EA:34, C8:F7:42 [Confirmed] — IEEE the IEEE MA-L registry

Registration dates

third-party aggregators list 2016-04-27 (34:EA:34), 2017-12-11 (78:0F:77), 2018-10-13 (C8:F7:42) — explicitly NOT IEEE facts [Unknown as IEEE fact] — maclookup.app, rst.im

Security note

independent research (Attify blog) demonstrates an evil-twin Wi-Fi attack against the Broadlink A1 — an attacker with prior knowledge of the network's SSID/password sets up a spoofed access point, deauthenticates the device, and the device auto-reconnects to the spoofed AP, after which it can be queried directly via an unofficial Python client; not vendor-confirmed or cross-checked against a primary CVE database. A separately circulated claim of an undocumented firmware "suicide" reset function on BroadLink devices could not be corroborated against a primary source and is not asserted here

[Likely] — blog.attify.com

Related vendors

none independently confirmed [Unknown]

Analyst note

three separate OUI assignments plus independent security-research coverage of BroadLink hardware indicate a real, deployed IoT product line rather than a bare-shell registration.