AS873

AS873 is a small, single-homed Government of Ontario network (GONET-ASN-17) that currently originates exactly one IPv4 prefix, 204.41.240.0/24, and no IPv6 space, with a single visible upstream and no downstream customer cone.

ARIN RDAP places AS873 inside a block record named GONET-ASN-17, spanning AS857–AS885, registered to the Government of Ontario's Ministry of Public and Business Service Delivery and Procurement, Infrastructure Technology Services (org handle GOVER-10; vCard org name "GONET"). That block's top-level autnum registration event dates to 1990-08-07, with the record last changed 2021-02-23. No PeeringDB net record exists for ASN 873 specifically (the API returned "Entity not found"), and no operator-published "about" or peering-policy page was located on ontario.ca — network type, peering policy, and a dedicated operator website are therefore Unknown rather than sourced.

On the routing side, RIPEstat, CAIDA, bgp.he.net, and bgp.tools agree AS873 originates only 204.41.240.0/24 (256 addresses) and no IPv6, with a CAIDA AS rank of 67,700 and topology degree of one provider, zero peers, zero customers — a customer cone that is a singleton (itself). The sole visible adjacency, AS852 (TELUS Communications Inc.), is confirmed independently by two BGP-collector sources as both upstream and only observed peer. RIPEstat shows the prefix visible to 328 of 329 RIS peers, first seen 2022-02-05. No ROA exists for the prefix, so its RPKI validation status is unknown.

The network geolocates to Toronto, Ontario, Canada, matching the ARIN registrant address. CAIDA separately flags AS873 as a routing "clique member" despite its singleton customer cone and single-provider adjacency — an atypical combination for that designation, recorded here as an unresolved data anomaly rather than an independently verified fact.

Exposure

Single stub network with one announced /24 and one upstream; no peers, no customer cone, and RPKI status unknown (no ROA) for its only prefix, so route-origin validation cannot currently protect it — RIPEstat RPKI tab for AS873.

Abuse contact posture

The registered ARIN abuse/technical POC (CSB8-ARIN, "Cyber Security Branch," CSOC@ontario.ca) is flagged by ARIN itself as unresponsive to validation since 2023-11-07; a second POC (DOMAI415-ARIN) has been unresponsive since 2019-12-03 — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873.

Blocklist status

Unknown as of a 2026-08-09 check — Spamhaus and Talos Intelligence reputation-center lookups both returned HTTP 403 to automated fetch, so neither a listed nor a not-listed determination could be confirmed.

Routing hygiene flag

bgp.he.net displays an "announces bogons" flag for AS873, from a single third-party BGP-observability source not corroborated elsewhere — a routing-hygiene note, not a malware or abuse verdict.

Passive DNS artifact

Robtex lists one hostname resolving within AS873's address space (a bank-impersonation-styled subdomain of an unrelated third-party domain); no threat-verdict source could be reached to confirm or refute anything about it, so it is recorded only as an unverified artifact and is not an abuse finding against the Government of Ontario registrant.

Operator

Government of Ontario, Ministry of Public and Business Service Delivery and Procurement, Infrastructure Technology Services (GONET); ARIN org handle GOVER-10 [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873

Country / RIR

CA, ARIN [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873

Allocated

1990-08-07 (ARIN RDAP top-level autnum registration event for block GONET-ASN-17, AS857–AS885, which contains AS873); last changed 2021-02-23 [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873

Org status

Active (ARIN autnum status "active"); two of three listed ARIN POCs flagged unvalidated by ARIN since 2023-11-07 and 2019-12-03 respectively [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873

Contacts

CSOC@ontario.ca (Cyber Security Branch, ARIN POC CSB8-ARIN, unresponsive to validation since 2023-11-07); registrant address 222 Jarvis Street, 6th Floor, Toronto, ON M7A 0B6, Canada [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873

Security/abuse context (NEUTRAL, DATED)

no confirmed public abuse or blocklist finding as of a 2026-08-09 check — Spamhaus and Talos lookups returned HTTP 403 and could not be read; bgp.he.net shows a single-source "announces bogons" flag; registered ARIN abuse contact unresponsive since 2023-11-07

Network & routing

Network type

Government (inferred from ARIN registrant identity only — no dedicated PeeringDB net record for AS873 and no operator-published network-type statement found) [Likely] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873, https://www.peeringdb.com/api/net?asn=873

Size

1 IPv4 prefix (204.41.240.0/24, 256 addresses), 0 IPv6 prefixes; customer cone = 1 ASN (itself), 1 prefix, 256 addresses; CAIDA AS rank 67,700 [Confirmed] — https://bgp.he.net/AS873, https://bgp.tools/as/873

Routing/peering

topology degree 1 (0 customers, 0 peers, 1 provider); sole upstream/peer AS852 (TELUS Communications Inc.), confirmed via two independent BGP-collector sources; visible to 328/329 RIPE RIS peers, first seen 2022-02-05 [Confirmed] — https://bgp.he.net/AS873, https://bgp.tools/as/873

RPKI

no ROA found; RIPEstat validation status "unknown" for 204.41.240.0/24 (Routinator, no validating ROAs); bgp.tools describes it as matching an unauthenticated IRR source [Confirmed] — https://bgp.tools/as/873

Notable usage

No operator-published usage page found; based only on the ARIN registrant chain, the network appears to support Government of Ontario provincial IT operations — an inference from registry contact data, not a sourced usage claim [Unknown] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873

Related ASNs

AS857 (block-anchor of the same GONET-ASN-17 range, AS857–AS885, of which AS873 is a member); AS852 (TELUS Communications Inc., sole upstream/peer) [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873, https://bgp.he.net/AS873

Analyst note

Small, single-homed Ontario provincial-government stub ASN with one announced prefix and no ROA. AS873 carries no ASN-specific PeeringDB record, so operator-facing fields (website, network type, peering policy) are Unknown/inferred rather than operator-sourced. CAIDA's cliqueMember flag is inconsistent with the singleton cone and single-provider adjacency and is recorded as an unresolved anomaly, not an independently confirmed fact.