Autonomous system detail

AS873

Announced

Operated by GONET-ASN-17 - GONET.

Summary

// analyst note
Small, single-homed Ontario provincial-government stub ASN (one /24, one upstream, no peers, no customer cone, no ROA). No PeeringDB net record exists for AS873; operator-facing fields (network type, peering policy, website) are Unknown/inferred rather than operator-sourced. CAIDA flags cliqueMember true despite a singleton customer cone — an unresolved anomaly recorded as-is, not independently explainable. A single passive-DNS artifact (an unrelated third-party hostname) was observed resolving within this AS's address space by robtex but could not be corroborated against any threat-verdict source and is not an abuse finding against the registrant.
// security note
NEUTRAL/DATED: no confirmed public abuse or blocklist finding for AS873 as of a 2026-08-09 check; Spamhaus and Talos reputation-center lookups returned HTTP 403 and could not be read either way.
IPv4 prefixes
1
~256 addresses
IPv6 prefixes
0
Peer networks
1
1 up · 0 down
IANA block
1-1876
Assigned by ARIN
[ 01 ] — Context

About this ASN.

Updated  ·  Confidence: Medium

AS873 is a small, single-homed Government of Ontario network (GONET-ASN-17) that currently originates exactly one IPv4 prefix, 204.41.240.0/24, and no IPv6 space, with a single visible upstream and no downstream customer cone.

ARIN RDAP places AS873 inside a block record named GONET-ASN-17, spanning AS857AS885, registered to the Government of Ontario's Ministry of Public and Business Service Delivery and Procurement, Infrastructure Technology Services (org handle GOVER-10; vCard org name "GONET"). That block's top-level autnum registration event dates to 1990-08-07, with the record last changed 2021-02-23. No PeeringDB net record exists for ASN 873 specifically (the API returned "Entity not found"), and no operator-published "about" or peering-policy page was located on ontario.ca — network type, peering policy, and a dedicated operator website are therefore Unknown rather than sourced.

On the routing side, RIPEstat, CAIDA, bgp.he.net, and bgp.tools agree AS873 originates only 204.41.240.0/24 (256 addresses) and no IPv6, with a CAIDA AS rank of 67,700 and topology degree of one provider, zero peers, zero customers — a customer cone that is a singleton (itself). The sole visible adjacency, AS852 (TELUS Communications Inc.), is confirmed independently by two BGP-collector sources as both upstream and only observed peer. RIPEstat shows the prefix visible to 328 of 329 RIS peers, first seen 2022-02-05. No ROA exists for the prefix, so its RPKI validation status is unknown.

The network geolocates to Toronto, Ontario, Canada, matching the ARIN registrant address. CAIDA separately flags AS873 as a routing "clique member" despite its singleton customer cone and single-provider adjacency — an atypical combination for that designation, recorded here as an unresolved data anomaly rather than an independently verified fact.

Operator
Government of Ontario, Ministry of Public and Business Service Delivery and Procurement, Infrastructure Technology Services (GONET); ARIN org handle GOVER-10 [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873
Country / RIR
CA, ARIN [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873
Allocated
1990-08-07 (ARIN RDAP top-level autnum registration event for block GONET-ASN-17, AS857–AS885, which contains AS873); last changed 2021-02-23 [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873
Org status
Active (ARIN autnum status "active"); two of three listed ARIN POCs flagged unvalidated by ARIN since 2023-11-07 and 2019-12-03 respectively [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873
Contacts
CSOC@ontario.ca (Cyber Security Branch, ARIN POC CSB8-ARIN, unresponsive to validation since 2023-11-07); registrant address 222 Jarvis Street, 6th Floor, Toronto, ON M7A 0B6, Canada [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873

Security/abuse context (NEUTRAL, DATED)

no confirmed public abuse or blocklist finding as of a 2026-08-09 check — Spamhaus and Talos lookups returned HTTP 403 and could not be read; bgp.he.net shows a single-source "announces bogons" flag; registered ARIN abuse contact unresponsive since 2023-11-07

[Likely] — https://bgp.he.net/AS873, https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873

Network & routing

Network type
Government (inferred from ARIN registrant identity only — no dedicated PeeringDB net record for AS873 and no operator-published network-type statement found) [Likely] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873, https://www.peeringdb.com/api/net?asn=873
Size
1 IPv4 prefix (204.41.240.0/24, 256 addresses), 0 IPv6 prefixes; customer cone = 1 ASN (itself), 1 prefix, 256 addresses; CAIDA AS rank 67,700 [Confirmed] — https://bgp.he.net/AS873, https://bgp.tools/as/873
Routing/peering
topology degree 1 (0 customers, 0 peers, 1 provider); sole upstream/peer AS852 (TELUS Communications Inc.), confirmed via two independent BGP-collector sources; visible to 328/329 RIPE RIS peers, first seen 2022-02-05 [Confirmed] — https://bgp.he.net/AS873, https://bgp.tools/as/873
RPKI
no ROA found; RIPEstat validation status "unknown" for 204.41.240.0/24 (Routinator, no validating ROAs); bgp.tools describes it as matching an unauthenticated IRR source [Confirmed] — https://bgp.tools/as/873
Notable usage
No operator-published usage page found; based only on the ARIN registrant chain, the network appears to support Government of Ontario provincial IT operations — an inference from registry contact data, not a sourced usage claim [Unknown] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873
Related ASNs
AS857 (block-anchor of the same GONET-ASN-17 range, AS857–AS885, of which AS873 is a member); AS852 (TELUS Communications Inc., sole upstream/peer) [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/873, https://bgp.he.net/AS873
Analyst note
Small, single-homed Ontario provincial-government stub ASN with one announced prefix and no ROA. AS873 carries no ASN-specific PeeringDB record, so operator-facing fields (website, network type, peering policy) are Unknown/inferred rather than operator-sourced. CAIDA's cliqueMember flag is inconsistent with the singleton cone and single-provider adjacency and is recorded as an unresolved anomaly, not an independently confirmed fact.
[ 02 ] — Announced prefixes

What this network routes.

1 prefixes total · RIPEstat data · cached, not real-time
// IPv4 prefixes1
  1. 204.41.240.0/24/24
// IPv6 prefixes0
No IPv6 prefixes announced.
[ 03 ] — Notable peers & upstreams

Who it talks to.

1 observed neighbour
// Notable connectionsTop 1 of 1
ASNOperatorRole
AS852 ASN852 - TELUS Communications Inc. upstream
Neighbours observed via public BGP collectors; not a complete peering list.