AS812

AS812 is an actively announced, high-traffic autonomous system registered to Rogers Communications Canada Inc., the cable-broadband arm of Canada's largest telecom group, currently carrying roughly 1,400–2,100 IPv4 prefixes and 600–700 IPv6 prefixes with no notable public abuse signal found.

CAIDA AS Rank places AS812 at global rank 232 with a customer cone of 229 ASNs, 7,331 prefixes, and about 10.48M addresses, and flags it as a clique member — effectively Tier-1-equivalent connectivity. RIPEstat's live snapshot shows ~1,426 IPv4 prefixes (~5.78M addresses) and 692 IPv6 prefixes; bgp.he.net's snapshot differs somewhat (up to ~2,978 counting more-specifics), a normal artifact of different collector sets rather than a real discrepancy.

The ASN's most consequential public event is the July 8, 2022 nationwide Rogers outage: a faulty router configuration change during maintenance removed an ACL filter, triggering an IGP breakdown that withdrew roughly 970 BGP prefixes and cut service to an estimated 11–12 million customers for 15+ hours. Cloudflare, Kentik, ThousandEyes, and Canada's CRTC all published independent post-mortems; no comparable incident has been documented since.

Peering detail comes only from Rogers' operator-submitted PeeringDB record (net 307), since Rogers does not publish a peering policy on its own domain: Selective policy, contract required, mostly-inbound traffic ratio, 1–5 Tbps traffic level, public peering at Equinix Ashburn/Chicago/New York and TorIX (Toronto), plus several private-interconnect facilities. CAIDA counts 9 upstreams and 20 settlement-free peers; named ASNs for either were not retrieved.

RPKI coverage could not be checked at the RIPEstat ASN level (that endpoint requires a specific prefix argument). A bgp.tools search snippet reports roughly 1,589 RPKI-valid originations against 6 invalid — a large majority valid — but this is a secondhand summary, not a direct page read, so it is treated as Likely rather than Confirmed.

Abuse signal

No confirmed Spamhaus ASN-DROP or SBL listing found; a direct spamhaus.org check returned HTTP 403 (blocked to automated fetch), so absence is reported as Unknown rather than a hard confirmed-clean result.

Spam telemetry

CleanTalk reports 78,024 detected IPs across AS812 space with 2,701 (~3.46%) spam-active — a background rate typical of a very large residential dynamic-IP ISP, not an abuse-tolerant network.

NANOG history

The one substantive NANOG-archive thread involving AS812 (2007) has Rogers' own ops team complaining that its newly assigned prefixes were over-aggressively filtered by other networks' stale bogon lists — Rogers as complainant, not subject.

Operational incident

The July 2022 outage was a human-error configuration failure, not a security compromise or abuse event; it is documented here for context, not as a threat signal.

Customer hygiene

Public Rogers community-forum threads (circa 2020) show the operator proactively notifying customers of malware/botnet callback activity from their home connections — routine residential-ISP hygiene, not evidence against the network itself.

Operator

Rogers Communications Canada Inc. (RIR-registered holder of AS812; wholly-owned operating subsidiary of publicly traded parent Rogers Communications Inc., TSX: RCI.A/RCI.B, NYSE: RCI) [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP autnum 812, about.rogers.com/investor-relations

Country / RIR

CA, ARIN [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP autnum 812

Allocated

2002-07-24 (ARIN RDAP autnum TOP-LEVEL registration event, UTC-4); a separate ARIN Org record (RCC-182) carries its own 2016-10-20 update timestamp — do not conflate the two [Confirmed] — rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/812

Org status

active; parent Rogers Communications Inc. is a publicly traded Canadian company (TSX: RCI.A/RCI.B, NYSE: RCI); related ASN AS19835 (Rogers FCI) is being migrated/consolidated into AS812 [Confirmed] — rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/812, about.rogers.com/investor-relations

Contacts

abuse@rogers.com (role mailbox); registrant org address 333 Bloor Street East, 9th Floor, Toronto, ON M4W 1G9, Canada [Confirmed] — rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/812

Security/abuse context (NEUTRAL, DATED)

no notable public abuse signal as of 2026-08-01 — no confirmed Spamhaus ASN-DROP listing (direct check blocked, HTTP 403, so treated as Unknown not Confirmed-clean), CleanTalk shows a background ~3.46% spam-active rate typical of a large residential ISP, no NANOG abuse-complaint thread found

Network & routing

Network type

Cable/broadband ISP — the Cable-segment ASN for Rogers (residential/business broadband, TV, voice); related Rogers ASNs cover wireless, wholesale, and other business units [Confirmed] — peeringdb.com/net/307, peeringdb.com/asn/19835

Size

~1,400–2,100 IPv4 prefixes (~5.78M addresses) and ~600–700 IPv6 prefixes depending on source snapshot; CAIDA customer cone 229 ASNs / 7,331 prefixes / ~10.48M addresses [Confirmed] — stat.ripe.net/AS812, asrank.caida.org/asns/812, bgp.he.net/AS812

Routing/peering

CAIDA AS rank 232 (clique/Tier-1-equivalent); degree total 236 (9 upstreams, 20 settlement-free peers per CAIDA, though bgp.he.net counts ~257–296 total observed BGP adjacencies including customer/provider sessions); named upstream/peer ASNs not retrieved [Confirmed for counts; Likely for peer-count reconciliation] — asrank.caida.org/asns/812, bgp.he.net/AS812

Peering policy

Selective, contract required, mostly-inbound ratio, 1–5 Tbps traffic level, public peering at Equinix Ashburn/Chicago/New York and TorIX Toronto (per operator-submitted PeeringDB record; Rogers publishes no peering policy on its own domain) [Confirmed for PeeringDB content; noted as third-party-hosted, operator-self-reported] — peeringdb.com/net/307

RPKI

not queryable from the ASN-level RIPEstat endpoint (requires a --prefix argument); bgp.tools search snippet reports ~1,589 RPKI-valid vs 6 RPKI-invalid originations [Likely] — bgp.tools/as/812

Notable usage

production ASN for Rogers Cable — ~10.6M homes passed via fibre/HFC (2025), transcontinental fibre serving enterprise/wholesale customers (e.g. TekSavvy); site of the July 8, 2022 nationwide outage (15+ hours, ~11–12M customers, human-error maintenance failure, ~970 prefixes withdrawn) [Confirmed] — about.rogers.com/investor-relations, blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflares-view-of-the-rogers-communications-outage-in-canada, crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/reports/xona2024.htm

Related ASNs

AS19835 (Rogers FCI, migrating into AS812), AS26788 (Rogers Communications Canada), AS36868 (Rogers Capital Technology Services), AS393431 (Rogers West Group) [Confirmed] — peeringdb.com/asn/19835, peeringdb.com/net/2177, peeringdb.com/net/10425, peeringdb.com/net/6855

Analyst note

Allocated-date confirmed from the RDAP autnum TOP-LEVEL events block (2002-07-24), distinct from the ARIN Org record RCC-182's own 2016-10-20 update timestamp — the two must not be conflated. The July 2022 outage is the dominant public event associated with this ASN and is an operational/reliability incident, not a security or abuse finding.