AS803

AS803 is an actively announced regional access-ISP ASN registered to Saskatchewan Telecommunications (operating as SaskTel), a Canadian provincial Crown corporation that is today originating 44 IPv4 prefixes and 3 IPv6 prefixes. It was allocated by ARIN on 2002-01-15, with a last-changed registry event of 2012-03-02.

Routing-wise, AS803 carries a CAIDA AS Rank of 1288 (clique member) with a customer cone of 26 downstream ASNs (211 prefixes, roughly 699,136 addresses) and a total AS degree of 58 (24 customer, 29 peer, 5 provider). Third-party lookups (bgp.tools, bgp.he.net) list Cogent (AS174), Bell Canada (AS577), Zayo Bandwidth (AS6461), and FlexNetworks (AS19523) as upstreams, though this was not independently re-fetched against the source pages.

SaskTel's own PeeringDB record describes a Selective peering policy (no contract required, no ratio requirement) with an IRR as-set of AS803:AS-CUSTOMERS, and lists public peering at 100G across Equinix Chicago, MICE, SIX Seattle (dual ports), TorIX, and VANIX.

Operationally, SaskTel is the largest ICT provider in Saskatchewan and one of Canada's last provincially owned telecoms, serving roughly 1.3–1.4 million customer connections with wireline, 5G/LTE wireless, IPTV, security-monitoring, and data-centre/cloud lines of business. Fiscal 2025–26 results reported net income of $104.7 million CAD on operating revenues above $1.3 billion CAD, with $465.9 million CAD in planned capital investment; coverage reached 94% of the province on 5G and 99% on LTE as of mid-2026.

Blacklist status

AS803 is not present on the Spamhaus ASN-DROP list as of 2026-08-01.

Third-party spam signal

CleanTalk reports a near-zero (0.00%) spam rate for the AS803 /16 block 204.83.0.0/16, with only 16 of 1,511 historically-flagged IPs currently active — consistent with ordinary residential-ISP background noise rather than an elevated abuse signal.

Individual-IP reports

scattered AbuseIPDB reports exist against specific customer IPs inside AS803's residential ranges; this reads as routine compromised-endpoint/botnet noise typical of any large access ISP, not a documented ASN-wide abuse pattern.

Anti-spoofing (BCP38)

CAIDA's Spoofer Project shows mixed compliance across 34 tested blocks — 11 blocked, 19 rewritten (spoofed source altered but not fully filtered), 2 unknown — most recently tested November 2023.

Documented incident

a province-wide outage on 2025-08-22 (~9 hours), caused by a software update to VoLTE equipment, disrupted cellular voice and roughly 3,000 business voice lines; 911 emergency calling was unaffected.

Community record

no NANOG-archive abuse thread or Cisco Talos reputation-center entry for AS803 was located in this research pass; treated as Unknown rather than a confirmed absence.

Operator

Saskatchewan Telecommunications (operating as SaskTel; holding entity Saskatchewan Telecommunications Holding Corporation), a Crown corporation owned by the Government of Saskatchewan [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP, sasktel.com/about-us/company-info

Country / RIR

CA, ARIN [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP autnum/803 (registrant address Regina, SK)

Allocated

2002-01-15 (ARIN RDAP autnum top-level registration event); last changed 2012-03-02 [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP autnum/803

Org status

active Crown corporation (Government of Saskatchewan, no public shareholders); ~1.3–1.4 million customer connections; fiscal 2025–26 net income $104.7M CAD on operating revenues over $1.3B CAD; $465.9M CAD capital investment planned for 2025/26; 94% of Saskatchewan covered by 5G, 99% by LTE (mid-2026)

[Confirmed] — saskatchewan.ca/government/news-and-media/2026/june/23, sasktel.com/about-us/company-info

Contacts

registrant org handle SASK, ARIN-registered address 8th Floor, 2121 Saskatchewan Drive, Regina, SK, S4P-3Y2, Canada [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP autnum/803. Abuse contact: handle SCA266-ARIN ("Sasknet Complaint Abuse"), org SaskTel, role/group vCard, complaint.abuse@sasktel.com

[Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP autnum/803, RIPEstat abuse-contact-finder

Security/abuse context (NEUTRAL, DATED)

no notable public abuse signal found as of 2026-08-01 — not on Spamhaus ASN-DROP; CleanTalk shows a near-zero spam rate for 204.83.0.0/16; ordinary residential-ISP-level individual-IP reports on AbuseIPDB; mixed BCP38/anti-spoofing compliance per CAIDA Spoofer (11/34 blocks fully filtered); a documented 2025-08-22 province-wide VoLTE-software-update outage (~9 hours, non-security)

Network & routing

Network type

Cable/DSL/ISP — regional access/broadband and telecom operator (per PeeringDB self-classification) [Confirmed] — peeringdb.com/asn/803

Size

44 IPv4 prefixes / ~526,592 IPv4 addresses announced; 3 IPv6 prefixes announced; customer cone 26 ASNs, 211 prefixes, ~699,136 addresses; CAIDA AS Rank 1288, AS degree total 58 (customer 24, peer 29, provider 5) [Confirmed] — stat.ripe.net/803, api.asrank.caida.org/v2/restful/asns/803

Routing/peering

Selective peering policy, no contract required, no ratio requirement, IRR as-set AS803:AS-CUSTOMERS; public peering at 100G on Equinix Chicago, MICE, SIX Seattle (dual ports), TorIX, VANIX [Likely — SaskTel's own PeeringDB record, vendor-submitted, last updated 2022-07-27] — peeringdb.com/asn/803. Upstreams reported as AS174 (Cogent), AS577 (Bell Canada), AS6461 (Zayo Bandwidth), AS19523 (FlexNetworks)

[Likely, single corroborating source pass] — bgp.tools/as/803, bgp.he.net/AS803

RPKI

Unknown — RIPEstat's rpki-validation endpoint requires a per-prefix argument, so an ASN-level query returns nothing; no posture claimed [Unknown] — stat.ripe.net/803

Notable usage

incumbent ISP/telecom for the province of Saskatchewan; the only remaining provincially owned (Crown corporation) telecom operator in Canada; wireline, wireless/5G, IPTV (maxTV), home security, and data-centre/cloud lines of business

[Confirmed] — sasktel.com/about-us/company-info, peeringdb.com/asn/803

Related ASNs

none identified in this research pass [Unknown]

Analyst note

Encountered as an actively routed regional-ISP ASN for a Canadian provincial Crown corporation. Routing data (RIPEstat, CAIDA) is internally consistent and Confirmed; the PeeringDB-sourced peering-policy detail and the bgp.tools/bgp.he.net upstream list are single-source and tagged Likely. RPKI posture is Unknown because RIPEstat's rpki-validation endpoint requires a per-prefix argument and returns nothing for an ASN-level query; the abuse-contact address (complaint.abuse@sasktel.com, handle SCA266-ARIN) is now recorded as Confirmed.