AS566

AS566 (registered under ARIN as SSC-299-Z-566) is a Canadian federal government autonomous system operated by Shared Services Canada (SSC), the Government of Canada agency responsible for consolidating IT infrastructure — data centers, networks, and telecommunications — across roughly 45 federal departments and agencies since its 2011 founding. The ASN's ARIN RDAP registration date of 1990-07-13 predates SSC's own founding by 21 years, indicating AS566 was originally assigned to an earlier federal department or agency and later folded into SSC's organizational umbrella when SSC absorbed departmental IT operations. Current BGP visibility is thin and partially conflicting: bgp.he.net lists five IRR-valid IPv4 /24 blocks (142.74.1.0, .2.0, .3.0, .4.0, and .8.0), roughly 1,280 addresses, while bgp.tools reports zero originated prefixes on a page it flags as disconnected from realtime updates — a discrepancy this record notes rather than resolves. Both routing sources agree the ASN has no upstream transit and a single visible peer, AS376 (RISQ Inc., a Quebec research-and-education network), making AS566 a small, government-only, largely non-transit stub. No RPKI ROA data was found, and no public abuse or security signal ties directly to AS566's announced space as of July 2026. It should not be confused with AS2675, a separate, larger, actively peering SSC-operated ASN with its own published peering policy.

Operator

Shared Services Canada (SSC / Services partagés Canada), Government of Canada federal shared-IT-services agency; ARIN org handle SSC-299-Z, ASN registration name "SSC-299-Z-566" [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/566

Country / RIR

Canada, ARIN [Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/566

Allocated

1990-07-13 (ARIN RDAP autnum top-level "registration" event, read from the object root alongside handle=AS566/name=SSC-299-Z-566 — not an entity/org/contact date); last changed 2017-07-13. Cross-confirmed by bgp.tools' own "registered July 13, 1990 (35 years old)" statement

[Confirmed, two independent angles] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/566, https://bgp.tools/as/566

Org status

active Government of Canada agency; consolidates IT (data centers, WAN, telecom) for roughly 45 federal departments since 2011 [Confirmed] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_Services_Canada

Contacts

434 Queen Street, PO Box 9808 STN T CSC, Ottawa, ON K1G 4A8, Canada; hostmaster/abuse is reachable at the departmental function mailbox ssc.enterpriseddi-entreprise.spc@ssc-spc.gc.ca (SSC Enterprise DDI / Entreprise SPC). Three further POCs on the record are named individual SSC staff whose personal mailboxes are not reproduced here

[Confirmed] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/566

Security/abuse context (NEUTRAL, DATED)

no notable public abuse signal found as of 2026-07-11 across Spamhaus, IPQualityScore, IPinfo, and NANOG-list searches specific to AS566; unrelated Canada-themed security news (a CSIS botnet-disinfection warrant; the "Kimwolf" IoT botnet arrest) surfaced but does not implicate AS566 and is explicitly not attributed here [Confirmed absence of signal, per multiple searches] — https://www.spamhaus.org/blocklists/spamhaus-blocklist/, https://www.ipqualityscore.com/asn-details/AS566/shared-services-canada

Network & routing

Network type

government/federal shared-IT-services stub network; administratively active but minimal current BGP footprint [Likely] — https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/566, https://bgp.tools/as/566

Size

sources conflict — bgp.he.net lists 5 announced IPv4 /24 prefixes (142.74.1.0/24, 142.74.2.0/24, 142.74.3.0/24, 142.74.4.0/24, 142.74.8.0/24; ~1,280 addresses) all marked IRR Valid, while bgp.tools shows 0 originated IPv4 prefixes on a page explicitly flagged as not connected to realtime data; 0 IPv6 prefixes per both sources [Likely for the 5-prefix count, given the explicit list; Confirmed for 0 IPv6] — https://bgp.he.net/AS566, https://bgp.tools/as/566

Routing/peering

0 upstreams (both sources agree); sole visible peer AS376 (RISQ Inc., Quebec R&E network) [Confirmed]. Peering policy for AS566 itself is Unknown — no PeeringDB record found; a "selective general peering" policy exists for AS2675, a different, larger SSC-operated ASN, and must not be attributed to AS566

[Unknown for AS566's own policy] — https://bgp.he.net/AS566, https://bgp.tools/as/566, https://www.peeringdb.com/net/20183

RPKI

Unknown — no ROA data visible on bgp.tools; bgp.he.net's "IRR Valid" tag on the announced prefixes reflects IRR route-object validity, a distinct signal from RPKI ROA validation, and is not conflated with it here [Unknown] — https://bgp.tools/as/566

Notable usage

registered 1990, 21 years before SSC's 2011 founding, implying original assignment to an earlier federal department/agency later consolidated under SSC; the specific original assignee could not be confirmed and stays Unknown [Likely for the consolidation inference; Unknown for original assignee] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_Services_Canada

Related ASNs

AS2665, AS2675, AS2679, AS2682 — other ASNs registered to the same Shared Services Canada organization per third-party ASN lookups; AS2675 in particular is a separate, larger, actively peering SSC ASN with its own peering policy — do not conflate with AS566 [Likely] — https://bgpview.io/asn/566

Analyst note

A small, government-only stub AS with a well-confirmed 1990 registration date but a genuinely conflicting prefix-count picture across two BGP-observability sources; neither source is dismissed, the conflict is stated rather than resolved. Not to be confused with AS2675 (SSC's other, larger, actively peering ASN).