Autonomous system detail  ·  US flag US

AS53667

Announced

Operated by FranTech Solutions, US flag US.

Summary

// analyst note
Multi-tenant shared/ephemeral VPS — attribute to a tenant, not FranTech. Also a notable Tor-exit-hosting ASN, so some IPs are anonymity endpoints with unreliable per-IP geolocation.
// security note
NEUTRAL/DATED/SOURCED, multi-tenant: shared/ephemeral VPS IPs; abuse attaches to tenants, not the operator.
IPv4 prefixes
41
~34.3K addresses
IPv6 prefixes
34
announced
Peer networks
148
2 up · 19 down
IANA block
53248-54271
Assigned by ARIN
[ 01 ] — Context

About this ASN.

Updated  ·  Confidence: High  ·  6 sources  ·  How this page is checked

AS53667 is the network behind the BuyVM and Frantech.ca VPS brands, operated by FranTech Solutions and registered under ARIN to an address in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Founded by Francisco Dias around 2007, it is a budget KVM VPS host known for cheap "slices," optional DDoS-protected IPs, and an explicitly permissive acceptable-use policy. It is a small BGP network — roughly 47–55 IPv4 prefixes (~34,000–37,000 addresses) and ~35–48 IPv6 prefixes — taking transit from Cogent, Hurricane Electric, and UFINET, with partial RPKI coverage. The decisive triage consideration is that this is multi-tenant, shared, and often ephemeral VPS space: an analyst seeing a 209.141.x.x or 104.244.7x.x address should treat it as a rented VPS that may rotate between unrelated customers, so any observed behavior attaches to a tenant rather than to the operator. FranTech is also one of the larger Tor-exit-hosting ASNs by the operator's own account. Its abuse-dataset presence is real but roughly proportional to its size, and the operator publicly engages abuse reports and terminates for malicious use; no sanctions or law-enforcement action against the operator was found as of June 2026.

Operator
FranTech Solutions (ARIN OrgId SYNDI-5; abuse/tech contact Francisco Dias) [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP
Country / RIR
US (Cheyenne, WY), ARIN [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP
Allocated
ASN RegDate 2010-11-19 (org RegDate 2010-07-21) [Confirmed] — ARIN
Org status
active — frantech.ca / buyvm.net

Security/abuse context (NEUTRAL, DATED, SOURCED — multi-tenant)

shared/ephemeral VPS IPs; abuse attaches to tenants, not the operator. Scamalytics describes FranTech as "potentially medium fraud risk," ~67,797 IPs mostly running VPNs/proxies/servers/Tor exits [Scamalytics, ongoing]. AbuseIPDB shows individual BuyVM IPs with many reports (e.g., a Tor-exit-labeled 104.244.74.55) [community-sourced]. A 2019 Bromium Labs study (via BleepingComputer) named FranTech among hosts whose servers appeared in Necurs-botnet malware-distribution infrastructure [Bromium/BleepingComputer, 2019]. Operator engages abuse reports on LowEndTalk and terminates for malicious use. No sanctions/LE action found as of 2026-06-07 — scamalytics.com, bgp.tools

Network & routing

Our research recorded 50 IPv4 prefixes; RouteViews currently observes 41.
Network type
hosting-VPS (free-speech/abuse-tolerant budget VPS; brands BuyVM, BuyShared) [Confirmed]
Size
~47–55 IPv4 prefixes (~34,048–37,376 addrs), ~35–48 IPv6 — bgp.he.net / bgp.tools (2026-06)
Routing/peering
~417 peers, 5 upstreams; upstreams incl. Cogent (AS174), Hurricane Electric (AS6939), UFINET (AS52468); 2 IXes; RPKI partial (~77 valid, 7 invalid, IPv4) — bgp.tools, bgp.he.net
Notable usage
operates BuyVM / Frantech.ca VPS brands — cheap KVM VPS, DDoS-protected IPs (via Path.net/Voxility), permissive AUP; founded ~2007 — frantech.ca / buyvm.net
Related ASNs
sibling AS63018 (FranTech). NOTE: AS3842 (RamNode) is a SEPARATE operator and must not be conflated with FranTech [Likely]
Analyst note
Multi-tenant shared/ephemeral VPS — attribute to a tenant, not FranTech. Also a notable Tor-exit-hosting ASN, so some IPs are anonymity endpoints with unreliable per-IP geolocation.
[ 02 ] — Announced prefixes

What this network routes.

75 prefixes total · as observed by RouteViews at 2026-09-20 · one collector view, not a global census
// IPv4 prefixes41
  1. 209.141.32.0/19/19
  2. 198.98.48.0/20/20
  3. 205.185.112.0/20/20
  4. 104.244.72.0/21/21
  5. 107.189.0.0/21/21
  6. 199.195.248.0/21/21
  7. 107.189.8.0/22/22
  8. 199.19.224.0/22/22
  9. 45.61.184.0/22/22
  10. 107.189.28.0/23/23
  11. 107.189.30.0/23/23
  12. 104.244.72.0/24/24
  13. 104.244.73.0/24/24
  14. 104.244.74.0/24/24
  15. 104.244.75.0/24/24
  16. 104.244.77.0/24/24
  17. 104.244.78.0/24/24
  18. 104.244.79.0/24/24
  19. 107.189.12.0/24/24
  20. 107.189.13.0/24/24
  21. 107.189.14.0/24/24
  22. 107.189.9.0/24/24
  23. 167.88.161.0/24/24
  24. 198.251.80.0/24/24
  25. 198.251.81.0/24/24
  26. 198.251.82.0/24/24
  27. 198.251.83.0/24/24
  28. 198.251.84.0/24/24
  29. 198.251.86.0/24/24
  30. 198.251.87.0/24/24
  31. 198.251.88.0/24/24
  32. 198.251.89.0/24/24
  33. 198.251.90.0/24/24
  34. 205.185.112.0/24/24
  35. 209.141.39.0/24/24
  36. 23.183.81.0/24/24
  37. 23.183.82.0/24/24
  38. 23.183.83.0/24/24
  39. 45.59.127.0/24/24
  40. 45.61.188.0/24/24
  41. 45.61.191.0/24/24
// IPv6 prefixes34
  1. 2a09:7500::/29/29
  2. 2605:6404::/32/32
  3. 2a0f:3044::/32/32
  4. 2a0f:7d05::/32/32
  5. 2605:6400:4000::/34/34
  6. 2605:6400:8000::/34/34
  7. 2605:6400:c000::/34/34
  8. 2604:4d40:2000::/36/36
  9. 2a11:2304::/37/37
  10. 2a10:fa81:1200::/40/40
  11. 2406:840:e351::/48/48
  12. 2406:840:e354::/48/48
  13. 2406:840:e35d::/48/48
  14. 2605:6400:1001::/48/48
  15. 2605:6400:1002::/48/48
  16. 2605:6400:1003::/48/48
  17. 2605:6400:1004::/48/48
  18. 2605:6400:10::/48/48
  19. 2605:6400:1::/48/48
  20. 2605:6400:20::/48/48
  21. 2605:6400:2::/48/48
  22. 2605:6400:300::/48/48
  23. 2605:6400:30::/48/48
  24. 2605:6400:3::/48/48
  25. 2605:6400:40::/48/48
  26. 2605:6400:9001::/48/48
  27. 2605:6400:9002::/48/48
  28. 2605:6400:9003::/48/48
  29. 2a14:7580:e451::/48/48
  30. 2a14:7580:e4d0::/48/48
  31. 2a14:7581:d101::/48/48
  32. 2a14:7581:d102::/48/48
  33. 2a14:7581:d103::/48/48
  34. 2a14:7581:d104::/48/48
[ 03 ] — Notable peers & upstreams

Who it talks to.

148 observed neighbours
// Notable connections32 of 148 observed

Neighbours observed by RouteViews at 2026-09-20, lowest ASN first. Relationships are inferences from the CAIDA AS Relationships Dataset, 2026-08-01, and establish no commercial arrangement; a dash means the inference did not resolve.

ASNOperatorRole
AS174 Cogent Communications, LLC upstream
AS6939 Hurricane Electric LLC upstream
AS950 — —
AS965 — downstream
AS1002 — —
AS1024 — downstream
AS1050 — downstream
AS6921 — downstream
AS9423 — downstream
AS10104 — —
AS14956 — downstream
AS25085 — —
AS25255 — downstream
AS26533 — downstream
AS30114 — downstream
AS30700 — —
AS32561 — downstream
AS33535 — downstream
AS40663 — downstream
AS40806 — —
AS40929 — —
AS40939 — downstream
AS43685 — downstream
AS44324 — —
AS44421 — downstream
AS44817 — —
AS46824 — downstream
AS46978 — downstream
AS48682 — downstream
AS49548 — —
AS50898 — —
AS53340 — downstream
Neighbours observed via public BGP collectors; not a complete peering list.