AS323

AS323 is a legacy autonomous system number registered under ARIN to the United States Department of Defense (DoD) as one entry in the flat allocation block DNIC-ASBLK-00306-00371 (AS306–AS371). The block is administered by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) out of its Columbus, Ohio facility, and the registry contacts route to the DoD Network Information Center (hostmaster-dod-nic@mail.mil). AS323 is a government/military stub AS: it provides no transit and is single-homed, observed routing through and peering with a single neighbour, AS306 (also a DoD/DNIC block). It originates a small slice of legacy DoD IPv4 — 55.36.0.0/16 (65,536 addresses, part of the 55.0.0.0/8 U.S. Army space attributed to USAISC/CONUS-RCAS) plus the more-specific 55.36.249.0/24 — and one IPv6 prefix, 2608:14b:4000::/40. Routing was last seen on 2026-06-26; at the 2026-06-28 RIPEstat snapshot the AS was not announcing (announced: false, announced_space = 0), so it appears intermittently routed. The prefixes carry no ROAs (RPKI originated-valid = 0 for both families), and bgp.he.net flags the space as bogon — consistent with the historically filtered, non-standard nature of DoD 55.0.0.0/8 rather than any operational misuse. No notable public abuse signal was found as of 2026-06-28 — not in Spamhaus DROP/SBL, AbuseIPDB, CleanTalk, FireHOL/Emerging Threats, or open-source ASN blocklists, and no BGP hijack, route-leak, or NANOG operator complaint naming AS323 surfaced in public archives.

Operator

United States Department of Defense (DoD); ARIN handle DNIC-ASBLK-00306-00371, administered by DISA, Columbus, OH [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP autnum 306 (block record for AS323), ipinfo.io/AS323

Country / RIR

US, ARIN [Confirmed] — RIPEstat abuse-contact-finder (authoritative_rir: arin), ARIN RDAP

Allocated

1989-06-30 (ARIN registry registration event for the AS306–AS371 block that contains AS323, a first-party RIR fact, NOT an IEEE date); last changed 2025-09-12 [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP autnum top-level events (rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/323 resolves to the AS306–AS371 block per ARIN's flat-block model)

Org status

active U.S. federal government agency; DISA is the DoD combat-support agency managing the DODIN/DISN, formerly the Defense Communications Agency (renamed DISA in 1991) [Confirmed] — en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_Information_Systems_Agency

Contacts

hostmaster-dod-nic@mail.mil (NOC/technical/abuse); arin-registrations@mail.mil; +1-844-347-2457 ext 2; 300 North James Road, Whitehall, OH 43213 (DISA-Columbus) [Confirmed for abuse via RIPEstat; Likely for phone/address via RDAP block record] — RIPEstat abuse-contact-finder, ARIN RDAP autnum 306

Security/abuse context (NEUTRAL, DATED)

no notable public abuse signal found as of 2026-06-28 — absent from Spamhaus DROP/SBL/ASN-DROP, AbuseIPDB, CleanTalk, FireHOL/Emerging Threats, and open-source ASN blocklists; no BGP hijack/route-leak/NANOG thread names AS323. The IPv6 bogon flag (2608:14b:4000::/40) is a DoD non-standard-address classification artifact, not an incident [Likely — feeds not exhaustively API-queried] — spamhaus.org/blocklists, seclists.org/nanog/2021/Apr/354, bgp.he.net/AS323

Network & routing

Network type

government / U.S. military stub AS; single-homed, provides no transit; classified "government" by IPinfo and "Content"/stub by bgp.tools [Confirmed] — ipinfo.io/AS323, bgp.tools/as/323

Size

small — 1 originated /16 (55.36.0.0/16 ≈ 65,536 IPv4 addresses) plus a more-specific 55.36.249.0/24, and one IPv6 /40 (2608:14b:4000::/40 ≈ 16.7M /64s) [Confirmed] — bgp.he.net/AS323, RIPEstat announced-prefixes

Routing/peering

single observed neighbour AS306 (also DoD/DNIC) — internal DoD routing, not commercial peering; RIS visibility 324/326 v4 and 323/323 v6 (cached/stale from when routes were active). First seen 2009-10-15, last seen 2026-06-26; NOT announcing at the 2026-06-28 snapshot (announced: false, announced_space = 0) [Confirmed for routing facts; Likely for AS306 being the formal upstream] — RIPEstat routing-status, as-overview, bgp.he.net/AS323

RPKI

no ROAs — RPKI originated-valid = 0 for both IPv4 and IPv6; prefixes unprotected by RPKI [Confirmed] — bgp.he.net/AS323

Peering policy

none published; no PeeringDB entry; DoD's DISN Connection Process Guide requires formal Assessment & Authorization / Authorizing-Official sign-off for any external connection, consistent with a closed government network [Confirmed] — dl.dod.cyber.mil DISN Connection Process Guide, bgp.tools/as/323

Notable usage

originates legacy DoD IPv4 (55.36.0.0/16, attributed to USAISC / U.S. Army, CONUS-RCAS) and 55.36.249.0/24, plus IPv6 2608:14b:4000::/40; one of many ASNs in the DNIC-ASBLK-00306-00371 block used for internal military/government networking under DISA [Confirmed] — bgp.he.net/AS323, ipinfo.io/AS323

Related ASNs

AS306 (DoD/DNIC, AS323's sole observed neighbour and block sibling); the broader AS306–AS371 DNIC block [Confirmed] — RIPEstat routing-status, ARIN RDAP

Analyst note

encountered as a legacy DoD stub ASN within a flat DNIC block; ARIN's per-AS RDAP for 323 resolves to the AS306–AS371 block record, so the 1989-06-30 registration date is the block-level autnum event (the correct autnum object for AS323). Intermittently routed; clean public reputation.