Autonomous system detail

AS188

Announced

Operated by SAIC-AS-188 - SAIC.

Summary

// analyst note
Low-numbered legacy ASN; WHOIS resolves to SAIC. Small government-oriented stub network. Prefix count/upstream identity differ by source (3 prefixes + AWS GovCloud on RIR-adjacent live sources vs ~39 prefixes + Cogent/Zayo on BGPView) — reported as a range. No public peering page on saic.com.
// security note
NEUTRAL/DATED: no notable public abuse signal found as of 2026-06-18; not on Spamhaus DROP; the 2011 TRICARE backup-tape theft was physical-media loss, not an AS188 network/routing incident.
IPv4 prefixes
3
~768 addresses
IPv6 prefixes
0
Peer networks
1
1 up · 0 down
IANA block
1-1876
Assigned by ARIN
[ 01 ] — Context

About this ASN.

Updated  ·  Confidence: High

AS188 is a low-numbered, early-registered Autonomous System Number held under ARIN by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a Fortune 500 U.S. defense and government IT contractor headquartered at 12010 Sunset Hills Rd, Reston, VA. The ARIN RDAP record carries an AS-level registration event of 1988-05-09 and a last-changed event of 2025-05-27, with OrgId SAIC-59; status is active. In practice AS188 functions as a small stub/enterprise network for SAIC's own infrastructure rather than a transit provider — it has no IPv6, no recorded IX presence, and no downstream customers. The number of announced IPv4 prefixes is source-variable: RIPEstat, bgp.he.net, bgp.tools, and IPinfo consistently show 3 /24 prefixes (149.64.200.0/24, 198.22.15.0/24, 198.151.10.0/24 — 768 addresses, all RPKI-valid), while one aggregator (BGPView) reports a substantially larger ~39-prefix footprint; the live RIR-adjacent routing sources favour the 3-prefix view, so it is best described as a small network with a source-variable upper bound. The upstream/transit picture also differs by angle: RIPEstat/bgp.he.net/bgp.tools/IPinfo show transit exclusively via Amazon Web Services GovCloud (AS8987) — consistent with SAIC's 2023 AWS Strategic Collaboration Agreement and government-cloud orientation — whereas BGPView reports Cogent (AS174) and Zayo (AS6461). RPKI posture is strong (valid ROAs on the observed prefixes). No notable public abuse signal was found as of 2026-06-18; the one well-known SAIC security event (the 2011 TRICARE backup-tape theft) was physical-media loss, not an AS188 network/routing incident, and is not an abuse signal for this ASN.

Operator
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) (ARIN OrgId SAIC-59, 12010 Sunset Hills Rd, Reston, VA 20190, US) [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP (https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/188)
Country / RIR
US, ARIN [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP
Allocated
ARIN AS-level registration event 1988-05-09; ASN last changed 2025-05-27 [Confirmed for the shown dates] — ARIN RDAP (https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/188)
Org status
active; SAIC is a publicly traded Fortune 500 company (NASDAQ: SAIC), ~$7.5B revenue, ~25,000 employees, founded 1969, defense/intelligence/federal-civilian IT services [Confirmed] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_Applications_International_Corporation, https://www.saic.com
Contacts
Technical — Ian Calvin Slade (ICS6-ARIN; individual mailbox on the saic.com domain, in the ARIN RDAP record); NOC/Abuse — SAIC Network Information Center (SAIC-NIC-ARIN), dw-noc@saic.com [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP (https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/188)

Security/abuse context (NEUTRAL, DATED)

no notable public abuse signal found as of 2026-06-18; not on Spamhaus DROP, no NANOG abuse threads located; the 2011 TRICARE backup-tape theft was physical-media loss, NOT an AS188 network event

[Likely] — bgp.tools (https://bgp.tools/as/188), https://www.spamhaus.org/blocklists/do-not-route-or-peer/

Network & routing

Network type
stub/enterprise (single-homed corporate/government-contractor network; not a transit provider; no IX presence) [Confirmed] — bgp.tools (https://bgp.tools/as/188), IPinfo (https://ipinfo.io/AS188)
Size
small and source-variable — RIPEstat / bgp.he.net / bgp.tools / IPinfo show 3 IPv4 /24 prefixes (768 addrs), 0 IPv6; one aggregator (BGPView) reports ~39 prefixes — reported as a range (2026-06) — https://bgp.he.net/AS188, https://bgpview.io/asn/188
Routing/peering
upstream source-variable — AS8987 (AWS GovCloud) per RIPEstat/bgp.he.net/bgp.tools/IPinfo [Confirmed for that view]; AS174 (Cogent) + AS6461 (Zayo) per BGPView [Likely, single-source] — https://bgp.he.net/AS188, https://bgpview.io/asn/188
RPKI
observed IPv4 prefixes carry valid ROAs; zero RPKI-invalid routes seen; no IPv6 to validate [Confirmed] — bgp.tools (https://bgp.tools/as/188), bgp.he.net (https://bgp.he.net/AS188)
Notable usage
SAIC's own internal corporate/government-contractor infrastructure; transit observed exclusively via AWS GovCloud (AS8987), consistent with SAIC's 2023 AWS Strategic Collaboration Agreement for government cloud [Confirmed] — https://www.saic.com/aws, https://investors.saic.com/news-releases/news-release-details/saic-announces-strategic-collaboration-agreement-aws
AS rank / customer cone
Unknown — not reported by bgp.he.net or bgp.tools for this small stub AS [Unknown]
Announced prefixes
149.64.200.0/24, 198.22.15.0/24, 198.151.10.0/24 [Confirmed] — bgp.he.net (https://bgp.he.net/AS188), IPinfo (https://ipinfo.io/AS188)
Analyst note
Low-numbered legacy ASN whose WHOIS resolves to SAIC; functions as a small government-oriented stub network. Prefix count and upstream identity differ by source (3 prefixes / AWS GovCloud on RIR-adjacent live sources vs ~39 prefixes / Cogent+Zayo on BGPView) — reported as a range; no public peering page on saic.com (PeeringDB lists "Open" but is stale, last updated 2022, with no active IX/facility).
[ 02 ] — Announced prefixes

What this network routes.

3 prefixes total · RIPEstat data · cached, not real-time
// IPv4 prefixes3
  1. 149.64.200.0/24/24
  2. 198.22.15.0/24/24
  3. 198.151.10.0/24/24
// IPv6 prefixes0
No IPv6 prefixes announced.
[ 03 ] — Notable peers & upstreams

Who it talks to.

1 observed neighbour
// Notable connectionsTop 1 of 1
ASNOperatorRole
AS8987 upstream
Neighbours observed via public BGP collectors; not a complete peering list.