AS140

AS140 (handle DNIC-AS-00140) is registered under ARIN to the United States Department of Defense, operated by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) through its DoD Network Information Center (DNIC) function. The ARIN registrant org is "United States Department of Defense (DoD)" (handle USDDD) at 3990 E. Broad Street, Columbus, OH; technical and abuse contacts resolve to DISA-Columbus (Whitehall, OH). The ASN carries unusual historical weight: ARIN dates its registration to 1987-12-03, placing it among the earliest-assigned autonomous systems and consistent with the DoD's foundational ARPANET-era role. It is one of dozens of legacy DoD DNIC ASNs. The key triage point is that AS140 is currently dormant at the BGP level — it announces zero IPv4 and zero IPv6 prefixes, and is withdrawn from the global routing table. RIPEstat RIS reports 0 of 326 IPv4 peers and 0 of 319 IPv6 peers seeing it; CAIDA reports a customer cone of just the ASN itself (0 prefixes, 0 addresses) and 0 degree relationships, ranking it 79459. The last observed BGP activity was prefix 131.84.124.0/23 around 2024-11-07 (RIPEstat), with bgp.he.net dating the ASN's last visibility to 2024-11-13; historically it originated 131.84.2.0/24 and 131.84.124.0/23, the first-seen route being 131.84.0.0/16 in August 2000. No notable public abuse signal was found across Spamhaus, CleanTalk, AbuseIPDB, or FraudGuard as of 2026-06-13, which is expected for a government/military ASN and is not itself evidence of active monitoring. RPKI posture is unknown because no prefix is currently announced.

Operator

United States Department of Defense (DoD) / DISA — DoD Network Information Center (DNIC); ARIN registrant org handle USDDD [Confirmed] — ARIN RDAP

Country / RIR

US, ARIN [Confirmed]

Allocated

ARIN ASN RegDate 1987-12-03 (per ARIN RDAP registration event; among the earliest-assigned ASNs); ASN last changed 2025-09-12 [Confirmed for the shown dates]

Org status

active registrant (DoD/DISA, an active U.S. federal combat support agency). AS140 itself is dormant — 0 prefixes announced, last seen in the global table ~2024-11 [Confirmed]

Security/abuse context (NEUTRAL, DATED)

no notable public abuse signal found as of 2026-06-13 (Spamhaus DROP/ASN-DROP, CleanTalk, AbuseIPDB, FraudGuard); absence is expected for a government ASN and is not evidence of active monitoring

Network & routing

Network type

U.S. federal government / military, legacy; currently dormant at BGP level (0 IPv4 / 0 IPv6 prefixes announced) [Confirmed]

Size

zero announced address space — 0 IPv4 prefixes, 0 IPv6 prefixes, 0 IPs; CAIDA customer cone = 1 ASN / 0 prefixes / 0 addresses — stat.ripe.net / api.caida.org (2026-06)

Routing/peering

not currently routed — RIPEstat RIS 0/326 IPv4 and 0/319 IPv6 peers seeing; CAIDA asnDegree provider/peer/customer all 0 [Confirmed]. bgp.he.net lists a single historical peer AS27064 (DoD NIC), not currently active [Likely] — bgp.he.net. No PeeringDB entry exists for AS140 [Confirmed]. RPKI posture Unknown (no prefix announced, validation skipped)

Notable usage

one of the earliest-assigned ASNs (1987), reflecting DoD/ARPANET origins; the broader DNIC/DISA operates g.root-servers.net (G-root) and serves as the .mil registrar, but AS140 itself carries no current routing activity — disa.mil

Related ASNs

many sibling DoD DNIC ASNs (e.g. AS749, AS27064); AS8003 (Global Resource Systems) was a separate 2021 DoD BGP pilot and is NOT AS140 [Confirmed for the AS8003 distinction]

Analyst note

A 2021 NANOG thread about large DoD prefix announcements concerned AS8003, not AS140; do not conflate. CAIDA lat/lon 0,0 is a null sentinel, not a coordinate. bgp.tools was login-gated and did not contribute.